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Abstract:  
Money laundering is a major threat facing governments, which has been more of a negative side 
effect of globalization. The threat money laundering poses lies in its feat to fund international 
terrorism and transnational criminal activities. Those lying threats led the international 
community to establish administrative bodies to combat them through the construction of global 
anti money laundering regimes. For example, this includes the establishment of the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF), which was established by the G7 in 1987, to detect and root out 
money laundering activities. The FATF and similar bodies stem out from the fact that detecting 
money laundering is not an easy task.  In fact, even researchers face difficulty in doing just that, 
to the extent that most research and studies conducted on money laundering have produced 
conflicting or widely varying results. In addition, the state-centric nature of the Anti-Money 
Laundering Regime (AMLR), as well as the occasional mismanagement that may sometimes 
occur may hinder the efforts of the AMLR. As a giant web interlinking nation states that are 
financially vulnerable while assisting them logistically, politically and internationally, the 
AMLR acts towards ending the five wars of globalization. Thus, the international ties and 
relation between these nation states in their struggle to combat money laundering is bolstered. 
Finally, the international community needs to invest in its multilateral relations to promote, 
develop and strengthen the AMLR in order to put an end, or at least limit transnational crime and 
corruption. 
 
Résumé : 
Le blanchiment de fonds représente à la fois un effet indésirable de la mondialisation et une 
menace majeure contre les gouvernements. L’essence de cette menace se trouve dans la 
proximité des activités de blanchiment d’argent au financement terroriste international et aux 
activités criminelles transnationales. La communauté internationale a établi des organismes 
administratifs pour combattre ce problème; un d’entre eux est le Groupe d’Action Financière 
(GAFI) qui a été formé en 1987 par le G7 afin de détecter et d’éradiquer des activités de 
blanchiment de fonds. L’existence du GAFI et d’autres organismes similaires est nécessaire car 
la détection du blanchiment de fonds n’a rien de simple. Le fait que la recherche ne soit pas plus 
facile mène souvent à des conclusions incompatibles et contradictoires. De plus, le Anti-Money 
Laundering Regime (AMLR; “le Régime anti-blanchiment de fonds”) est très centré sur l’état et 
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sa mauvaise gestion occasionnelle entrave ses efforts. L’AMLR est un réseau qui connecte les 
états-nations financièrement vulnérables en les aidant logistiquement, politiquement, et 
internationalement afin de d’agir contre les cinq guerres de la mondialisation. Ainsi, la lutte 
contre le blanchiment de fonds est soutenue par les liens et les relations internationales entre ces 
états-nations. Enfin, la communauté internationale doit investir dans ses relations multilatérales 
afin de promouvoir, de développer et de renforcer l’AMLR et par conséquent, restreindre ou 
même éliminer les crimes transnationaux et la corruption.	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An unfortunate phenomenon that is ever so present in the world, and whose role is that of enabler 
of widespread crime and corruption, is that of money laundering1. Perhaps, because of the lack of 
a perceived direct and emphasized role within the very lives of individuals, as compared to 
international terrorism for example, money laundering has not been accorded a strong degree of 
attention from individuals all around the globe. Yet, such a perception, be it purposely enforced 
by those who engage in money laundering or through sheer ignorance, is miscalculated at best. 
Money laundering has indeed been present throughout the ages and always been synonymous 
with illegitimate and at times illegal financial transactions.  Interestingly, the presence of money 
laundering has been in parallel with a number of other global phenomena standing out in the role 
that humans have played in shaping and perpetuating while at the same time taking measures for 
their hindrance. According to Moises Naim, governments have been fighting the five wars of 
globalization unsuccessfully for centuries, stressing on the fact that the five wars, “drugs, arms, 
intellectual property, people, and money”, are the real wars governments face as a result of 
globalization.2 
 Dating the establishment of the sovereign state system to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia—
a historical account disputed by certain scholars, such as Andreas Osiander3—the losing trend for 
sovereign territorial states would be estimable at roughly three centuries.4 The recent decades of 
globalization, which can be derived in part from technological advancements, have brought forth 
a global institutionalized structure, which in turn has reconfigured and further enabled 
international money laundering. Most notably, the proliferation of criminal behaviours and actors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Naim, Moises. “The Five Wars of Globalization” Foreign Policy Vol. 134 (2003): 29. 
2 Naim, “The Five Wars.” The five wars are empowered by globalization and the new strategies each war defeats. 
An interesting one that may be less obvious for the non-initiated readers is that of money laundering; like the other 
wars, ML is not bound by geography, defeating traditional notions of sovereignty. In turn these wars affect markets 
and governments by clouding their activities. 
3 Osiander, Andreas. “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth” International Organization 
Vol. 55, 2 (2001): 251 – 287. 
4 Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations.” 
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practicing a deterritorialized and transnational logic of organization has been established. 
Essentially, the phenomenon of transnational money laundering is illustrative of deterritorialized 
criminal activity.  
 
Empirical Data 
Notwithstanding the methodological constraints in accurately measuring the volume of money 
laundered empirically, international multilateral institutions have published varying results. 
Although it remains uncertain whether the factual volume of the global total is at US$2.85 
trillion, US$25 billion5, or in between, what is certain are the negative qualitative derivatives 
entailed in money laundering (ML). While the figures may be discouraging, contrary to Naim’s 
diagnosis, it does not so much signal the oncoming defeat of governments than to prompt actors 
in the global system to adapt to new forms of behaviour.6 One such type of interunit adaptation is 
the emergence of an anti-money laundering regime (AMLR). Therefore, Naim’s views 
demonstrate an asociological historical perspective, exhibiting a limited conception of what 
constitutes governance;7 he defines asociological as a linkage of societies’ behaviour and 
manifestation of the latter. By examining the phenomenon of transnational money laundering 
and the role of the anti-money laundering regime, a clear trend emerges in the positive evolution 
of the unitary state’s effort in combating money laundering to one that is multilateral and 
international in character and substance. The international community has recognized the very 
international nature of money laundering of the present day; such realization has prompted a 
truly multi-faceted and dynamic response that is clearly manifested in its trans-border character. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Marco Arnone and Leonardo Borlini. “International anti-money laundering programs: Empirical assessment and 
issues in criminal regulation” Journal of Money Laundering Control Vol. 13, 3 (2010): 234. 
6 Eleni Tsingou. “Global financial governance and the developing anti-money laundering regime: what lessons for 
international political economy?” International Politics Vol. 47, 6 (2010): 622. 
7 Naim, “The Five Wars.” 
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This has, over time, created the need for the implementation of a global regime of governance 
that effectively reflects the international causes and effects of money laundering. As states 
realized that money laundering is a phenomenon in which various countries share a linked role, 
the construction of a global anti money-laundering regime was indeed being implemented. Most 
importantly, the identifying factors of community, transparency, and cooperation, which are 
reflected in the effort to combat money laundering, are crucial in achieving the greater aims of 
global governance in a time of international financial instability and corruption. 
 Quantitatively attributing the current level of transnational money laundering to 
globalization may raise doubts as to whether globalization and transnational money laundering 
have a causal relationship. Grahame Thompson has maintained that the year 1914 was a more 
economically globalized world than it is today,8 that is at least the case in terms of quantifiable 
international trade. Extrapolation then presents us with the clear notion that globalization in itself 
does not necessarily accompany the multiplication of transnational money laundering. One may 
infer instead that the globalization trend of the recent decades is qualitatively at variance with 
previous historical junctures.  
 
Qualitative Data Linking to International Relations 
A distinct qualitative feature of the recent globalization, according to John Farlane and Karen 
Mclennan, is the threat to national and international security that transnational crime poses now.9 
However, rather than money laundering being a direct output of globalization, its prevalence is 
better understood in the hypothesis of the unique qualitative configuration that globalization has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Thompson, Grahame. “Economic Autonomy and the Advanced Industrial State” Global Politics. Ed. Anthony G. 
McGrew and Paul G. Lewis et al. Cambridge: Polity Press. 1992. 257. 
9 John. Farlane and Karen Mclennan. Transnational Crime: the New Security Paradigm. Working Paper No. 294 
(Australian National University, 2005): 2. 
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ushered for the phenomenon to be present. This recent qualitative distinctiveness has been 
attributed by the United Nations to the availability of new technological tools10 nonexistent 
during past globalization processes.  
 
Detecting and Tracing the ML Trail 
As mentioned, there exists a disagreement regarding the actual amount of money involved in 
transnational money laundering. This academic disagreement is not exclusively a matter of 
intellectual disputation between erudite individuals, but is also fundamentally a matter of 
methodological procedure. There are several methods available for measuring the magnitude of 
money laundering, which leads to disagreements among scholars—stemming from 
methodological differences. The following methods have been proposed by Brigitte Unger: field 
and case studies; surveys and interviews; suspicious or unusual transactions analysis; statistical 
discrepancy indicators (e.g. hot money method, residual approach and currency demand 
approach); latent variable approach; gravity model; abnormal prices for trade-based money 
laundering observation; and measurement by theory.11 However, these methods, and perhaps all 
methods in general, are not completely lacking in limitations. There will always be issues of 
representativity, biases, data interpretation,12 and so forth in the research process. 
 Further complicating the task is that different jurisdictions and financial institutions do 
not necessarily observe the same reporting guidelines;13 a state of affairs that the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) endeavours to ameliorate by developing guidelines for financial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 United Nations. The Impact of Organised Criminal Activities Upon Society at Large: Report of the Secretary 
General. (UN Doc. E/CN.15/1993/3. 1993): 4. 
11 Brigitte Unger. “Money Laundering – A Newly Emerging Topic on the International Agenda” Review of Law & 
Economics Vol. 5, 2 (2009): 808. 
12 Ibid, 810. 
13 Ibid, 809. 
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institutions.14 The FATF is an inter-governmental policy making body established to set 
standards and methods bolstering effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational 
measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other threats to the integrity of 
the international financial system.15 The biggest challenge lies conceivably in attempting to 
measure a phenomenon that is meant to be clandestine and makes measurement complicated as it 
implies a degree of detection. With such methodological challenges involved, it is perhaps no 
surprise that estimates of global money laundering have not been uniform.  
 The IMF’s estimated figures were between 2 and 5 per cent of the world’s GDP,16 that is 
between US$800 billion and US$2 trillion,17 while Reuter and Truman promote estimates 
ranging between US$25 – US$150 billion.18 Conversely, Masciandaro et al19 estimates 
significantly higher figures. As a consequence, the global estimates feature a range as 
outstretched as US$2.85 trillion and US$200 – 500 billion,20 while Thatchuk surmises as low as 
around 1 trillion.21 Considering the far-ranging divergence in calculations, Naylor’s estimate 
may be the most accurate of all. He quipped that “the only thing that can be stated with certainty 
is that the actual figure is not likely to be less than 0 per cent or more than 100 per cent.”22 To 
enable further skepticism regarding the ability to obtain accurate empirical data, money 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Bruce Zagaris. “The Merging of the Counter-Terrorism and Anti-Money Laundering Regimes” Law and Policy in 
International Business Vol. 34, 1 (2002): 84. 
15 Bruce Zagaris. “The Merging of the Counter-Terrorism and Anti-Money Laundering Regimes” Law and Policy in 
International Business Vol. 34, 1 (2002): 86. 
16 Daniel Lindner. “Money Laundering Between States: A Comparison of International Money Laundering Control 
Mechanisms” Defense Counsel Journal Vol. 74, 1 (2007): 53. 
17 Naim Moises. “The Five Wars of Globalization” Foreign Policy Vol. 134 (2003): 34. 
18 Marco Arnone and Leonardo Borlini. “International anti-money laundering: Empirical assessment and issues in 
criminal regulation” Journal of Money Laundering Control Vol. 13, 3 (2010): 234. 
19 Masciandaro, Donato, Elöd Takáts, and Brigitte Unger. Black finance: the economics of money laundering. 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007. 35. 
20 Leonardo Borlini. “Issues of the International Criminal Regulation of Money Laundering in the Context of 
Economic Globalization” SSRN Working Paper Series (2008): 18. 
21 Kimberly L. Thachuk, “Foreword” Transnational Threats: smuggling and trafficking in arms, drugs and, human 
life. Ed. Kimberly L. Thachuk. (Westport: Praeger Security International. 2007): 17. 
22 Eleni Tsingou. “Global financial governance” 622. 
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laundering is argued as multiplying itself through its own mechanisms; it is expected that an 
additional increase of 6 – 10% should be expected years ahead.23 Although arguably, the more 
convincing lesson is that the figures are not static, but rather fluctuate up and down.  
 
Process of AML and Conceptual Core of ML Actors 
Money laundering as a phenomenon may be dissected in three stages: 1. Disassociating the funds 
from the illegal method by which it was procured; 2. Concealing the process of re-legitimization; 
and, 3. Reintroduction into the legal sphere disguised as legally obtained money.24 In short, 
“disassociation, obfuscation, and legitimation.”25 Leonardo Borlini refers to them as “placement, 
layering, and integration”26— a process by which money acquired through illegal means is made 
to appear legal. The forms of illegal activity employed to obtain the money, a method employed 
to re-legitimize the money and the ultimate use of the money laundered, can be infinitely 
diversified.  
 As stated by Margaret Beare and Stephen Schneider, the only limitation is the creative 
imagination of the managing actors of the operation.27 Indeed, individuals engaged in money 
laundering are not bound to local national procedural obstacles or international mistrust; whereas 
states differ in their agendas and priorities, money launderers have the one aim of perpetuating 
money laundering, which brings out a multi-faceted and harmonized effort on their part. Naylor 
reports that corporate actors are the prime executors and beneficiaries of transnational money 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Leonardo Borlini. “Issues of the International Criminal Regulation of Money Laundering in the Context of 
Economic Globalization” SSRN Working Paper Series (2008): 17. 
24  R. T. Naylor, Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underground Economy (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 2004): 142. 
25 R. T. Naylor, Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underground Economy (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 2004): 142. 
26 Leonardo Borlini. “Issues of the International Criminal Regulation of Money Laundering in the Context of 
Economic Globalization” SSRN Working Paper Series (2008): 20. 
27 Margaret. E. Beare and Stephen. Schneider, Tracing of Illicit Funds: Money Laundering in Canada. (Ottawa: 
Solicitor General of Canada. 1990): 304. 
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laundering, and such findings should be met with a sober and calculated response, especially in 
considering that the current capitalist regime is indeed the driving force behind the economies of 
the First World.  Nevertheless, the diversity of beneficiaries and launderers can include drug 
dealers, diplomats, bankers, religious authorities, politicians, dictators, and terrorists.28 
Diagnostically, assembling an exhaustive compendium of every possible type of actors involved 
in money laundering would be equivalent to assembling a list of every possible type of person in 
the world. Even the pope can be a money launderer if he were part of a chain that obtained funds 
illegally, concealed the illegal origins of the money, and reintroduced them into the legal 
economy as legitimate. In other words, perpetrators of money laundering are part of all the steps 
in the process yet are more often ignorant of their own role in this complicated chain of 
intertwined licit and illicit activities.  
 The endless possible forms of laundering methods can be exemplified in race tracks, 
lotteries, mixed payments, purchases and retail, receipt of payments by cheque, underground 
banking, transport of money or goods by mail, diplomatic pouches, property, and scams. 
Unorthodox schemes have also been attempted such as aspirations to purchase and create 
microstate countries – having a small geographical area, possessing their own political unit 
within a small population thus creating a “sovereign state” – an example is Vatican City.29 The 
feat of owning banks has however been done;30 Peter Quirk recounted the story of how an IMF 
team discovered 100 small banks without legitimate banking business in a country of less than 
100,000 people.31 Equally infinite in possibility is the manner in which the successfully 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Leonardo Borlini. “Issues of the International Criminal Regulation of Money Laundering in the Context of 
Economic Globalization” SSRN Working Paper Series (2008): 37. 
29 R. T. Naylor, Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underground Economy (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 2004): 168. 
30 R. T. Naylor, Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underground Economy (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 2004): 168. 
31 Peter J. Quirk. “Money laundering: Muddying the macroeconomy” Finance and Development Vol. 34,  (1997): 7. 
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laundered money will be utilized. One such manner is the funding of terrorist operations,32 which 
is why, post-9/11, a main international preoccupation came to be the financing of terrorist 
organizations through money laundering. Accordingly, provisions addressing the issue were 
integrated into the anti-money laundering regime.33 
 
Roots and History of ML 
Ontological inquiry into money laundering requires a distinction between the historical origin 
and the causal origin of the practice. Considering the insufficiently explored nature of money 
laundering in academia, as pointed out by Unger,34 only a hypothesis for its causal origin and its 
historical origin can be offered here. Naylor hypothesized that the practice of money laundering 
may date its origin between 1792–1750 BC, at the same time as the institution of the first 
genuine tax code in Hammurabi’s Babylonia.35 If Naylor’s hypothesis is grounded on the 
reasoning that a government created a situation inducing the beginning of money laundering, 
then there is insufficient empirical evidence available to support the claim that this was the very 
first case. Due to its untestable nature, this is ultimately pure speculation. More convincing is 
Naylor’s aphorism that “as long as there has been a need to hide a financial transfer, something 
like money laundering has occurred.”36 From Naylor’s hypothesis, a clear presence of dependent 
and independent variables is occurring thus satisfying the threshold of testability. There is 
moreover no automatic assumption that all laundered money is illegally generated. Proceeds 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Norman Mugarura. “The institutional framework against money laundering and its underlying predicate crimes” 
Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance Vol. 19, 2 (2011): 181.  
33 Eleni Tsingou. “Global financial governance and the developing anti-money laundering regime: what lessons for 
international political economy?” International Politics Vol. 47, 6 (2010): 625. 
34 Brigitte Unger. “Money Laundering – A Newly Emerging Topic on the International Agenda” Review of Law & 
Economics Vol. 5, 2 (2009): 807. 
35 R. T. Naylor, Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underground Economy (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 2004): 134. 
36 Ibid. 
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from drug trafficking may notably be illegally generated, but tax evasion is a case where money 
is legally generated and afterwards stolen, further necessitating its concealment and subsequent 
laundering. 
 Having appraised the scale and typology of transnational money laundering, a delineation 
of its detrimental effects from a political economy and legal perspective is necessary. In this 
manner, the pressures for global international behavioural adaptation, mostly carried out through 
institutional innovation, becomes the focal point in combating money laundering. This paper 
endorses the view that transnational money laundering should be studied through a 
multidisciplinary approach inclusive of sociology and criminology, but here, only a less 
ambitious approach of focusing on the political economy and legal perspectives can be afforded. 
 Transnational money laundering in certain cases implies the existence of underground 
networks of criminal organization spanning multiple national jurisdictions relatively unimpeded 
by territorial borders.37 The presence of money laundering can portend ruinous activities in 
institutions and society in general. For there to be money laundering, there has to be criminal 
activity; otherwise, concealment of the money procurement procedure and the effort to 
reintroduce the money as legitimate would be unnecessary. Money laundering in political 
institutions can be evidence of corruption. In the case of financial institutions, it can entail 
circumstances of fraudulent behaviour and embezzlement that jeopardizes the reputation of the 
institution.38 Marco Arnone and Leonardo Borlini have asserted that money laundering facilitates 
crime and corruption,39 which impedes economic growth by decreasing economic efficiency by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Leonardo Borlini. “Issues of the International Criminal Regulation of Money Laundering in the Context of 
Economic Globalization” SSRN Working Paper Series (2008): 2. 
38 Leonardo Borlini. “Issues of the International Criminal Regulation of Money Laundering in the Context of 
Economic Globalization” SSRN Working Paper Series (2008): 16. 
39 Marco Arnone and Leonardo Borlini. “International anti-money laundering programs: Empirical assessment and 
issues in criminal regulation” Journal of Money Laundering Control Vol. 13, 3 (2010): 234. 
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misallocating financial services away from efficient economic activity.40 It also draws economies 
away from their production possibilities frontier. In these conditions, the stability of financial 
systems is endangered by market distortions from mass reallocation and redistribution of illegal 
money.41 This is especially true in developing countries where amassed laundered money can 
exceed the resources of the state.42 Alarmingly, mass movements of illegal money can alter 
exchange rates and interest rates,43 as shown in Nigeria’s experience.44 
 Just like sham banks, money laundering can also entail the proliferation of front 
companies, also known as “shell” companies.45 Front companies are owned by criminal social 
forces for the purpose of mixing laundered money with legitimate money to transform money 
from illegal to legal.46 However, an accretion of legitimate private enterprises falling into the 
ownership of criminal elements purchased with laundered money risks the capture of the 
legitimate economy under criminal hands.47 An alternative version of a front organization 
recently emerged in the form of non-profit organizations, where the goals of such organizations, 
generally being seen as positive, overshadow or distract from their sources of finance and the 
procurement thereof.48 Money laundering is incontrovertibly an economic issue.49 As a corollary, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Ibid. 
41 Navin Beekarry. “The International Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
Regulatory Strategy: A Critical Analysis of Compliance Determinants in International Law” Northwestern Journal 
of International Law & Business Vol. 31, 1 (2011): 153. 
42 John McDowell and Gary Novis, The Consequences of Money Laundering and Financial Crime. (District of 
Columbia: United States of America: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, US 
Department of State, 2001). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Aluko, Ayodeji and Mahmood Bagheri. “The impact of money laundering on economic and financial stability and 
on political development in developing countries” Journal of Money Laundering Control. Vol. 15, 4 (2012): 33. 
45 Leonardo Borlini. “Issues of the International Criminal Regulation of Money Laundering in the Context of 
Economic Globalization” SSRN Working Paper Series (2008): 22. 
46 46 Leonardo Borlini. “Issues of the International Criminal Regulation of Money Laundering in the Context of 
Economic Globalization” SSRN Working Paper Series (2008): 15. 
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transnational money laundering represents a transnational economic phenomenon that affects 
contrasting economic systems. For instance, the proceeds of criminal economic activity in 
developing countries often ultimately integrates the licit economy through financial institutions 
of developed countries. The majority of recipient countries of money for laundering are 
developed nations; the leading recipient country is the United States.50 In comparison, the 
constraining effect on economic growth by money laundering decelerates the economic 
development of developing countries.51  
 
ML and its Challenge to Developing Nations 
The steps by which laundered money traverses to reach legitimate and legal status in world 
markets are important to note: economic inefficiencies occur, financial institutions get 
compromised, and criminal activity transpires. These are among other events supplanting any 
one state institution to clearly track the progress of the money involved. The money laundering 
process essentially sustains criminal activities and multiplies them effectively to the detriment of 
legitimate global markets.52 Disconcertingly, criminal organizations use laundered money to 
bribe politicians to buy them political influence in order to mould the executive decisions and 
laws of a political community.53 As Louis Shelley points out, the more money criminal 
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organizations have, the more influential they become.54 The most susceptible actors are new55 
and weak states56 whose politics are very much dependent and linked to their economic state. 
Additionally, money laundering’s effects spill over to other sectors of society, while governing 
the phenomenon through an individualist state strategy is very much ineffective. If the state is in 
retreat (and according to Van Creveld57 and Shelley58 it is in decline), the regime of global 
governance is in advance; at least, in regard to combating transnational money laundering. 
Indisputably, the state remains the primary institutional pillar of the world order. It is the only 
type of institution that can impose a comprehensive system of taxation. Neither can any other 
institution rival its ability to organize military forces. Nevertheless, institutions capable of 
governing beyond the territorial logic of the sovereign state are needed and the anti-money 
laundering regime is such an institution. 
 
Response Strategies 
Robert Keohane’s rational choice account of institutional emergence presupposing the existence 
of shared interests among actors appears valid in the case of the anti-money laundering regime.59 
The G7 held common concern for the ramifications of the global movement of illegal money,60 
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counting the United States as its most vocal supporter.61 The centrepiece of the regime is the 
FATF,62 which is an intergovernmental institution founded in 1989 by the G7. The FATF is 
comprised of 34 member jurisdictions and 2 regional organizations representing major financial 
centres all over the globe. The objectives of the FATF are to set standards and promote effective 
implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering, 
terrorist financing, and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial 
system.63 The multilateral architecture of the regime, which affects its durability,64 is consistent 
with Christian Reus-Smit’s argument that institutional design is influenced by systemic norms.65 
Its institutional matrix,66 in addition to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank 
(WB), United Nations (UN), and other regional organizations,67 is comprised of 31 member 
states.68 
 The anti-money laundering regime employs continuously evolving governance tools. 
Among these instruments is the ability to promulgate norms intended to regulate a diverse array 
of actors. These norms function as non-binding standards,69 also referred to as “soft laws”. In 
particular, the FATF’s 40+9 recommendations are considered to be standards or guidelines that 
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require conformity in bona fides.70 The FATF standards advise national legislative institutions on 
crime legislation while also providing guidelines for financial institutions to follow.71 Moreover, 
new instruments are being devised for imputing criminal liability on corporations by 
reconsidering the role of corporate officers and the circumscribed catalogue of culpable 
offences.72 Therefore, one can extrapolate the existence of analytic institutions within the 
FATF.73 By adopting and practicing these norms, a coordinated pattern of behaviour comes forth 
indicative of order encompassing states and non-state actors designed to respond to transnational 
money laundering. 
 
Consideration in Eradicating ML 
Moreover, the FATF developed an enforcement method to strengthen the effectiveness of its soft 
laws by constructing a comprehensive peer-reviewed monitoring process,74 and gained the ability 
to measure the level of compliance of members and non-members to its transmitted norms. 
Compliance is regarded as the absence of major deviations from the soft laws and it is inherently 
a measure of consistency between the soft laws and domestic legislation.75 Deficiency in 
corrective action from members and non-members provides basis to be listed in the Non-
cooperative Countries and Territories List.76 Arriving at this situation entails a damaged 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Navin Beekarry. “The International Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
Regulatory Strategy: A Critical Analysis of Compliance Determinants in International Law” Northwestern Journal 
of International Law & Business Vol. 31, 1 (2011):171. 
71 Bruce Zagaris. “The Merging of the Counter-Terrorism and Anti-Money Laundering Regimes” Law and Policy in 
International Business Vol. 34, 1 (2002): 82. 
72 Leonardo Borlini. “Issues of the International Criminal Regulation of Money Laundering in the Context of 
Economic Globalization” SSRN Working Paper Series (2008): 41. 
73 Andre Broome and Leonard Seabrooke. “Seeing like an International Organisation” New Political Economy Vol. 
17, 1 (2012): 3. 
74 Navin Beekarry. “The International Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
Regulatory Strategy: A Critical Analysis of Compliance Determinants in International Law” Northwestern Journal 
of International Law & Business Vol. 31, 1 (2011): 173 
75 Ibid:177. 
76 Ibid:180. 
	  	  
17 
reputation, inciting doubts regarding the country’s legitimacy to conduct business globally.77 
Even more serious, is Recommendation 21, also known as the “name and shame” procedure 
which was introduced in 1999. This involves the FATF urging global “financial institutions to 
closely scrutinize financial relations and transactions with persons, companies, and financial 
institutions” from the non-complying country.78 The effectiveness of these instruments appears 
relatively context-dependent. Countries with a more developed financial sector have more to 
lose, thus are more sensitive and more compliant.79 The well proven assumption behind the 
"name and shame" doctrine is that governments would not risk gaining notoriety as hubs or 
enablers of money-laundering, since the short term gains that the phenomenon might provide 
them with would be much more offset by the long term consequences their economies would 
face from the backing out of mistrustful international and local investors. Even the Republic of 
Seychelles was forced to repeal pro-money laundering legislation.80 
 
Setbacks, Obstacles, and Criticisms Facing the AMLR  
Eliciting legislative compliance from states also does not equate to actual results. The FATF also 
has its weaknesses, which consist of an exclusive and limited membership, and a lack of an 
appeal and oversight mechanism.81 This results in the absence of clearly defined criteria for what 
constitutes success for the anti money-laundering regime.82 Furthermore, Tsingou characterized 
the regime as “state-centric”.83 However, rather than proving the lack of efficiency of the system 
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of global governance related to money laundering, such difficulties are rather clear indications of 
“growing pains” by which all nascent institutions inevitably progress through, but only with the 
clear understanding of what is being replaced and what the short and long term goals are. 
Considering the current institutional configuration of the world, state-centrism for an 
international regime may be arduous to avoid, though not impossible; a firm-centric regime has 
existed before.84 Regardless, state-centrism is not necessarily a shortcoming, while the anti-
money laundering regime is relatively new and requires further adjustments and refinement.85 
Tsingou raised doubts regarding the anti-money laundering regime’s effectiveness, accusing it of 
being mostly symbolic.86 These sentiments are not without foundation. Many areas of further 
improvements, though not exhaustive, have been supplied above and, at least, something is being 
done: the regime’s formation was done; the regime’s soft laws were done; and the regime’s 
continued evolution is being done.  
 
The Light at the End of the Tunnel? 
The recent trend of globalization certainly created circumstances and opportunities that were and 
still are, in some cases, being exploited, especially through the unique and original methods 
employed by criminals. The ingenuity and potential of the agents of governance should however 
not be underestimated. The same forces that unleashed a deluge of transnational criminal activity 
are calling forth a social reorganization in governance, capitalization of newly available 
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technology and development of new instruments of governance as answers to the new 
challenges.  
By tracing the practice of money laundering as far back as Hammurabi’s Babylonia (1792 
BC – 1750 BC),87 Naylor implies that money laundering precedes the existence of the sovereign 
territorial state, a mode of socio-political organization possessing a distinct mode of governance. 
Considering the lineage, the designation as “the second oldest crime” may not be far off in 
accuracy. Conjointly, medieval Europe is another historical juncture that underlines the point that 
money laundering preceded the international system.88 These implications hint to Hendrik 
Spruyt’s contribution to historical sociology and its implicit insinuations; pertaining to this 
matter, the sovereign territorial state is not the sole historical institution capable of functioning as 
a social mechanism of governance.89 To quote Martin Van Creveld, “government and state are 
not the same… The latter is merely one of the forms which, historically speaking, the 
organization of government has assumed.” 90 
 
Recommendations  
It is not asserted here that the system of sovereign territorial states has passed. Rather, an 
approach that most simply can be described as cooperative, transparent, and harmonious in aims 
and efforts is called upon so that all states participate towards ending the exponential growth of 
money laundering. Whether or not the process will ever be completed shall be determined in 
hindsight, yet the steps towards success have already been undertaken with much diligence on 
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the part of global actors. Individual states still appear inclined to withhold their monopoly in 
criminal matters in varying degrees,91 which counteracts the optimal operation of the anti money-
laundering regime. A regime provides an institutional solution to the deterritorialized criminal 
elements seeking to evade the domestic governance of states. A regime does so by performing 
inter-territorial governance, which is one alternative of coping with the problems posed by the 
recent trend in globalization. Yet, it is not by a long shot the only possible solution. 
  In the realms of concepts such as money laundering, the only limitation is the human 
imagination; the sovereign state institutional form emerged from and resolved many medieval-
based problems. It may not be farfetched to expect that new institutional forms, whether as 
regime or other unit types will emerge and resolve the problems wrought by the recent trend of 
globalization. Contrary to Naim’s views, governance is not losing but rather evolving into a 
multi-layered purpose and effort. No longer do states see their integrity and wellbeing as solely 
achievable by their individual effort and accord. Sovereignty still lies with the state but it no 
longer has monopoly over governance; and perhaps, it never did. The currently forming anti-
money laundering regime is a proof that the globalizing world, characterized by international 
threats and issues, can only be remedied by a unified and harmonized system of governance. 
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